Do we need an alternative 'relational approach' to saviour siblings? by Wilkinson, Stephen
Do we need an alternative ‘relational
approach’ to saviour siblings?
Stephen Wilkinson
Michelle Taylor-Sands rejects the argu-
ment ‘commonly used to justify selective
reproduction, that it is better to be born
than not’.1 The supposed inadequacy of
this position is one of the things that
pushes her towards an alternative ‘rela-
tional’ approach. Here, I consider briefly
her three main objections:
1. The Non-Identity Problem does not
apply to all the risks associated with
the preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD) process.
2. The ‘life not worth living’ standard
applied in wrongful life cases is not
suitable for selective reproduction.
3. The reasoning described above has
‘morally objectionable’ implications.
RISKS FROM THE PGD PROCESS
One of Taylor-Sands’ most interesting sug-
gestions is that there might be a difference
between selecting a (future) child because it
is congenitally deaf and some other forms of
selective reproduction. Taylor-Sands accepts
that
An embryo selected because it is deaf
could only ever become a deaf child.
There are no other options for that
child apart from becoming a deaf child,
apart from non-existence (p. 18).1
But what goes for the deafness case
does not, she claims, apply to the whole
of selective reproduction
… additional risks of harm associated
with the PGD process (which involves
ART and embryo biopsy) … could be
avoided if the child is born naturally.
The non-identity problem is not relevant
to these risks of harm because there is
another option for the child—to be
born as a result of natural conception
(p. 18).1
It is difficult, however, to see much
difference between the deafness case and
the saviour sibling case in this respect. In
the choosing deafness case, the parents
have a choice between several embryos,
one of which will (if implanted) become a
deaf child. The Non-Identity Problem
engages because, were the parents to have
selected a hearing child instead, the deaf
child would not have existed. Therefore, it
is difficult for the deaf child to complain
of harm caused by selection-for-deafness,
because, were it not for the selection
process, he or she would not exist.
But can’t the same be said of saviour
sibling selection? If the saviour sibling
were to complain of damage caused by
the selection process, couldn’t the parents
answer as follows? We faced a choice
between having our next child through
‘natural conception’ or using PGD and
tissue typing, and we chose the latter. As a
result of that decision you were born in a
damaged state but, had we chosen ‘natural
conception’ instead, we would have ended
up with a different child, not you.
Taylor-Sands suggests that there is
another option for such children: being
born ‘as a result of natural conception’.
However, although this is a theoretical
possibility, it is not what would in fact
have happened if the parents chose
‘natural conception’. This is because the
probability of the very same gametes
coming together at conception in the two
different scenarios (sexual intercourse vs
in vitro fertilisation) is vanishingly small
(not least because of the enormous number
of possible different sperm that could be
involved). And, on a fairly standard view
of the Non-Identity Problem as applied to
human reproduction, ‘different gamete’
entails ‘different person’.2
It seems therefore that, in saviour
sibling cases, the Non-Identity Problem
does engage even when we consider the
risks of PGD. The ‘natural conception’
option is rarely relevant because it is, at
best, a theoretically possible one and not
one that would have led to the same child
being created in the most relevant alterna-
tive possible worlds.
QUALITY-OF-LIFE THRESHOLDS
Taylor-Sands cites a view, attributed to
Feinberg, that in wrongful life cases the
child is harmed only if ‘his/her life is so
bad that non-existence is rationally prefer-
able to existence’ (p. 18).1 She then
argues that it would be a mistake to apply
this quality-of-life threshold to selective
reproduction.
Her most important argument for this
is that, even if children are not harmed
overall by being created (even if their
aggregate lifetime welfare is more than
‘zero’) such children still suffer from
harmful events during their lifetime. They
both suffer harm and live with states of
harm. Say, for example, that parents delib-
erately choose to have a child with a
painful condition, X. That child’s life may
be ‘worth living’ overall but, nonetheless,
we can still legitimately say that the child
will suffer harmful experiences of the
symptoms of X, and that having X is a
harmed state.
This seems plausible, but what follows
from it? One thing that does not follow
from it is that the harm threshold is differ-
ent depending on whether we are consid-
ering wrongful life cases for existing
people, or contemplating selective repro-
duction for possible future people. For the
very same things can be said both. In both
cases, we can (at least in the abstract) ask
whether, all things considered, a life con-
tains more positive than negative elements
and perhaps conclude that, even if it is
really quite bad, the positive just outweighs
the negative. And in both cases, we
might still say that, even if it is a life worth
living overall, it is nonetheless one which
contains harmful episodes and one in
which the person lives with harmful states.
All of us experience harmful events from
time to time (ones that we would be better
off without), but that does not mean that
we were harmed by having been brought
into existence, or that our parents (or
other originators) did something morally




Taylor-Sands objects that ‘there seems to
be something morally repugnant about
justifying the use of PGD to select a child
who will experience considerable pain
and suffering on the basis that his/her life
may, overall, be a life worth living’
(p. 18).1 Most people, even those who
use this argument, would agree. However,
merely pointing this out neither solves the
Non-Identity Problem nor shows it to be
inapplicable. Rather, it is a restatement of
why the Non-Identity Problem is interest-
ing and troubling; intuitively, we want to
say that such cases are ‘repugnant’, but it
is difficult to support this ‘gut feeling’
because there seems to be no harm.
There are, however, ways of accommo-
dating this intuition which do not require
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a radically ‘relational’ approach. One is to
appeal to impersonal moral principles
such as Procreative Beneficence. According
to this, when choosing between possible
future children, we are morally obliged to
choose the one who ‘is expected to have
the best life, or at least as good a life as the
others’.4 Such principles often give a
reason not to select ‘a child who will
experience considerable pain and suffer-
ing’, that reason being the availability of a
different possible future child who would
have a better life.
In the case of saviour siblings,
Procreative Beneficence with respect to
the as-yet non-existent child needs to be
weighed against benefits to the parents
and to the existing child who needs a
donor. Nevertheless, these issues are, in
many respects, the same ones that any
family, or any doctor, must face when
contemplating intrafamilial living dona-
tion. As Taylor-Sands herself puts it,
It is … unsatisfactory to focus solely on
the individual interests of the child to be
born in assisted reproduction (p. 71).1
This seems entirely right, and it would
be hard to imagine a justification of
saviour sibling selection that did not
appeal to wider familial interests.
Whether however accommodating this
requires a fundamentally different ‘rela-
tional’ approach to bioethics or to the
welfare of the child is far from clear.
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